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Abstract —This paper details the research in progress into 
identifying and addressing the threats faced by voice assistants 
and audio based digital systems. The popularity of these systems 
continues to grow as does the number of applications and 
scenarios they are used in. Smart speakers, smart home devices, 
mobile phones, telephone banking and even vehicle controls all 
benefit from being able to be controlled to some extend by voice 
without diverting the attention of the user to a screen or having 
to use an input device such as a screen or keyboard. Whilst this 
removes barriers to use for those with accessibility challenges 
like visual impairment or motor skills issues and opens up a 
much more convenient user experience, a number of cyber 
security threats remain unanswered. This paper details a threat 
modelling exercise and suggests a model to address the key 
threats whilst retaining the usability associated with voice 
driven systems, by using an additional sound based 
authentication factor. 
Keywords— Authentication, Threat Model, Steganography, 
Two-factor Authentication, Cyber Security, Audio Security  
I. INTRODUCTION  
More than 200 million smart speakers have been sold in a 
trend that is showing year on year growth with Amazon’s 
Alexa powered devices accounting for over 100 million units. 
[1] Other devices such as mobile phones, laptops, home 
automation products and even cars are exploiting the benefit 
of providing the user with convenience of speech interaction. 
The ability to control technology without the distraction of a 
screen or the use of a tactile input device such as a touch 
screen or keyboard and mouse make voice a great choice for 
interactions demanding low cognitive load and no motor skills 
required on behalf of the user. One of the early applications 
that has been widely exploited by voice interaction for 
internet-based devices is search, with an estimated 50% of all 
adults having used voice for internet search, and over a billion 
voice searches per month. [2] Other growing uses include 
receiving the news and weather, streaming music and 
controlling smart home devices such as lighting and heating. 
Improvements in the accuracy and responsiveness of voice-
based systems continues as better machine learning models 
are developed and the cost of deployment continues to fall. [3]  
Despite the trends that are leading to wider adoption and 
increased usage, there are security and usability issues still to 
be addressed when considering this technology for high 
security applications. Many of the current implementations 
for voice channel interaction have limited command 
verification, authentication and identification and the present 
solutions that attempt to address security concerns have 
limitations that compromise usability. [4] Multi-factor voice 
driven authentication systems in high security environments 
such as online banking often have favourable perception with 
regards to security but at the expense of usability. [5] [6] In 
addition, there is a significant proportion of the world’s 
population who struggle to use existing digital technology due 
to physical restrictions, cognitive abilities or social and 
financial limitations. This includes physical difficulty in 
handling and manipulating devices, visual impairment, 
physical pain, social exclusion or financial challenges.   
According to the UK Office for National Statistics (ONS), 
nearly 10% of the workforce in UK lacks digital skills and at 
least 5% of the population have disabilities which limit their 
ability to use digital technologies. [7] This research sets out to 
investigate current threats, usability limitations and propose a 
new method of authentication for users of smart speakers and 
other digital audio-based systems. The research has outlined a 
number of threats and through threat modelling outlines a set 
of mitigations and a conceptual model that provides an 
additional factor based on sound, for authentication based 
upon the novel combination of existing technologies such as 
audio steganography, cryptography, GPS and cloud 
technology. 
II. BACKGROUND  
The most popular voice-controlled systems on the market 
today are provided across multiple platforms and devices. 
Amazon Alexa, Microsoft’s Cortana, Apple’s Siri and Google 
Assistant are delivered into phones, televisions, laptops, cars 
and smart speakers. Despite differences in branding and 
capabilities, they all have common factors and there are moves 
afoot to standardise the understanding of their architectures. 
[8]  Whilst not all of these systems are the same, the key 
components used in a typical architecture are as follows: 
A. End User Device 
The end user device or client is simply the device listening 
for commands or a “wake” word. In the most basic form, these 
require at least one microphone, a speaker, power source and 
internet connectivity usually provided by WiFi. With most 
implementations speech is turned into text for onward 
processing. Where interactions require it, this device also 
responds with audio, generated speech and occasionally visual 
prompts. Management of dialog and commands is usually 
specified in pre-determined intents. 
B. Cloud Based API 
The end user device typically connects to a cloud service 
provision where requests, commands and actions are sent to 
be processed. These are usually to a tight specification that 
ensures only the desired actions are permissible and executed.  
C. Voice Assistant Service Provider  
The provider of the service will also provide features such 
as user account management, user and/or device 
authentication, natural language processing, provision 
connections to a third-party application or service provider 
and an ecosystem that might involve user selectable 
applications or “skills” to consume and use. 
D. 3rd Party Application Service Provider 
Some voice-controlled systems and assistants provide 
access to third party skills and intents. As well as language 
processing this might require further API’s to service the 
requested service, data storage or integration with other 
applications. 
E. Companion App 
It is common for voice assistance and voice-controlled 
systems to have a companion app. Typically these provide a 
method of enrolment, access to more complex set up and 
configuration parameters and integration tools. 
In addition to the components used, it is helpful to consider 
a number of services and concepts upon which these voice 
controlled systems and voice assistants rely: 
F. Authentication 
Authentication is the process of identifying or proving the 
identity of a user, device or process. Traditionally, 
authentication is categorised into something you have, 
something you know, something you are. An important 
consideration when devising an authentication scheme is 
ensuring that the authentication is secure by having a strong, 
robust and secure enrolment process that binds the user, 
device or process to the digital version of their identity. 
G. Biometric Authentication 
Biometrics requires the comparison of a person’s intrinsic 
and unique physical or behavioural attributes with a stored 
value or representation of that attribute. Biometrics require a 
robust enrolment process to ensure the stored attributes are 
linked to a digital identity. The stored attributes also need 
careful protection from manipulation, tampering or theft. 
Within the audio domain, the main method employed for 
biometric authentication presently is voice biometrics. The 
main two voice biometric techniques in use are speaker 
verification and speaker identification. [9] 
H. Speaker Verification 
Speaker-verification is the process that authenticates a 
claim that a person is who he or she is by comparing the 
speakers voice with a database of reference voiceprints 
captured during a enrolment process. To be reliable, a speaker 
verification system must be able to deal factors such as 
environmental noise and health driven changes to a users 
voice. To deal with this the enrolment process may require an 
extensive number of samples. As a result the process is a 
statistical matching exercise rather than a binary yes or no. [9] 
There are various types of speaker verification: 
Table II-1 Speaker Verification in Voice Systems (Markowitz 2000) 
Verification Method User Action 
Text-dependant verification User is prompted to enter username and 
speak a password 
Text-dependent verification 
with speech recognition 
User is prompted to say a specific 
phrase, account number or PIN 
Text-prompted verification User enters a PIN or password then 
responds to prompts to repeat words or 
numbers  
Text-independent verification Users voice is verified covertly 
 
I. Speaker Identification 
Speaker identification refers to the identification of an 
unknown speaker. This technique does not require the user to 
respond to specific commands or prompts and is more 
concerned with identifying different speakers in a 
conversation or for providing enhanced personalisation.  
III. CURRENT AND EMERGING THREATS  
Automatic Speaker Verification (ASV) and voice biometrics 
offer a very low friction method of authenticating and 
controlling devices. There are still however some 
considerable issues and challenges to overcome before they 
can be deployed in high security environments and 
applications. In the UK, a BBC investigation into the use of 
voice biometrics by reporter Dan Simmons uncovered an 
issue where his telephone banking account service was 
accessed by his non-identical twin brother. The reporter 
enabled his HSBC bank account for access via his voice and 
it was then subsequently accessed by his brother who after 
seven failed attempts, managed to access the account by 
mimicking his brothers voice. The system also allowed for 
repeat attempts making the job of would-be attackers easier. 
[4] Many of the challenges and issues encountered by the 
deployment of ASV and voice biometrics are due to the low 
maturity of undying technology and can be attacked like any 
other cyber system. Research has drawn attention to serious 
limitations of voice only interactions with smart speakers and 
phones and the lack of command confirmation, voice 
authentication and any additional authentication factors. [10]  
Thanks to the improvements in machine learning, natural 
language processing and AI, the current state of the art 
systems are vulnerable to text to speech attacks using freely 
available tools. The quality of the output of synthetic speech 
has increased, and the amount of data required to train 
synthetic voices has decreased. Demonstrations of how such 
attacks can be carried out using modest resources have been 
shown at hacking conferences and published by Seymor et al. 
[11] One of the attacks demonstrated utilises an online voice 
simulation from a company called Lyrebird and was trained 
by providing 30+ voice samples and then can be commanded 
to convert any text to speech using the newly created “voice 
avatar.” [12] Another method demonstrated by Seymore et al. 
which was more robust to factors such as noise and 
interference was utilising open source tools Tacotron [13] 
[14] and Wavenet [15] and utilising voice samples freely 
available to the public. Given samples of sufficient quality 
audio it was concluded that voice authentication is relatively 
easy to subvert. New forms of attack are emerging that allow 
malicious actors to gain covert access to voice-controlled 
systems and assistants which are inaudible using ultrasonic 
sounds [16] or in comprehensible to the human owners of 
such systems using non-sensical word sequences which are 
interpreted as commands. [17] In addition, recent research 
has also shown it is possible to use laser light to remotely 
inject inaudible and invisible malicious commands into voice 
control enabled devices such as smart speakers, tablets, and 
phones across large distances and even through glass 
windows and from adjacent buildings. [18]  
IV. DEVELOPING A THREAT MODEL 
In order to address the security concerns associated with the 
current and emerging threats, simple threat modelling is 
required to drive the requirements of a secure audio-based 
authentication system. Threat modelling not only helps 
understand and prioritise the threats to be addressed but also 
outlines mitigation strategies that assist in the development of 
a conceptual model leading to a potential system 
implementation. [19] One challenge to this approach is that 
when using the modelling as a design tool for a model, we 
have to consider a generalised view to existing systems and 
models as these are many and varied, but with many 
vulnerable to the same vulnerabilities and  classes of attack. 
For most implementations, the authentication process for 
voice-controlled systems relies on a binding of the device 
during enrolment to a service and subsequently authenticating 
the device rather than the user, voice recognition, or the 
verification of text as previously discussed. Work has 
commenced on understanding the threats using both the 
STRIDE model and is shown in Table III-1 Simplified 
STRIDE Analysis of Conceptual Model and will be developed 
further using intelligence graphs in policy form to ensure all 
threats are understood and quantified. [20] 
V. DEVELOPING A CONCEPTUAL MODEL 
To address the threats, a new model has been developed that 
has centred on offering an additional authentication factor 
combined with preserving the ease of use of voice. The model 
developed thus far is the application of both existing public 
key cryptography techniques and a new audio steganography 
technique. When looking at the objective of secure and trusted 
communication across an untrusted media, it is first helpful to 
 
 















Replay Attack Attacker replays a covertly recorded voice sample 
Voice 
Synthesis 
Speech synthesis and/or text-to speech adapted to the 
characteristics of the target or brute force attack 
Impersonation 
& Deep Fake 
Attacker mimics the target for 
verification/authentication using trained models in 




Attacker uses light, ultrasound, infrasound or 
fragments of sound to intiate covert commands 
Technical 
Exploitation 
Attacker exploits a vulnerability in the implementation 
of the system 
 
 




Spoofing Authentication User pre-enrolled keys, user 
bound devices, multi-factor 
authentication  
Tampering Integrity Use of session keys and hashes 




Use of user-bound devices 
(biometrics), record of location, 




Confidentiality Public key encryption used data in 





Availability Additional authentication factor 




Authorisation User can only execute commands 
associated with their ID privilege   
 
 
consider the conceptual model of a public key cryptography 
system as illustrated in Figure V-1 Public Key Crypto Model. 
In this scenario the sender can send a secret message to a 
recipient without the need to exchange a secret key. To build 
an equivalent of a public key infrastructure with a sound based 
password, a number of processes and components are 
required. The end user needs to create a key pair and encode 
the public key into a sound using steganography. There then 
needs to be a way of enrolling into the scheme such that a 
recipient can lodge their audio public key with the equivalent 
of a Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) provider or Certificate 
Authority (CA). An enrolment process is shown in Figure V-2 
Novel Audio PKI Conceptual Model Enrolment Process 
The novelty in this model using audio and an out of band path 
such as a sound coming from the users mobile phone to 
complete the overall authentication. In this process, the public 
keys are hidden not to provide security, rather for the purpose 
of not interfering with the audio quality of the sound used to 
convey them. This is much the same as a public facing website 
which offers its public key in a certificate in a browser not as 
a set of ACSII values visible to the user, but as a simple 
padlock. This obfuscation is about audio usability and the 
security in the model comes from the underlying cryptography 
and the out of band confirmation described in the model 
below. This approach offers a new avenue of audio user 
experience where the sounds used could be derived from 
secure sounding clips such as a safe closing, a padlock 
snapping shut or tech sound. Alternatively the sound used for 
a public key could actually be music branded by the user or 
company offering the service adding a marketing or 
personalisation opportunity in a way that certificates or 
passwords cannot. Once an infrastructure or cloud service 
provider has a directory of previously enrolled “Audio Public 
Keys” the question of how they could be used arises. If the 
objective is to minimise user authentication friction whilst 
maintaining or even enhancing security, a number of factors 
can be considered such as location of the user, verification of 
a user’s enrolled device, authentication of the user and 
mitigating the impact of threats such as tampering, spoofing, 
interception, interjection and replay attacks. In Figure V-3 
Novel Audio PKI Conceptual Model – Command Verification 
Process, a model is proposed that could be used to provide 
mutual trust between the provider or a voice assistant “skill” 
or service and the end user. The concept works as follows: The 
user initiates a voice command which is received by the voice 
assistant device. Once the originator of the request and its 
validity has been confirmed, the voice assistant responds with 
two things. The command response and the users pre-enrolled 
audio public key. The audio key can be decoded by the 
steganography decoding and checked against the locally 
stored private key. In addition, the voice assistant service 
provider generates a unique session token which is sent to the 
users out of band device (this could be either a phone or IOT 
device). Using the private key in the local key storage, the 
users device then generates a session key with the token, the 
 
Figure V-3 Novel Audio PKI Conceptual Model – Command Verification Process 
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location, device ID and user ID. Once the session key is 
received (out of band – digitally) the voice assistant service 
provider can execute the command and any onward actions.  
VI. EXPERIMENTAL WORK 
Eexperimental work is in initial stages and has been started 
to evaluate the proposed model. The steganographic method 
used to hide the public keys in sounds was devised as part of 
earlier related research conducted into “Two-factor 
authentication for voice assistance in digital banking using 
public cloud services.” [21] [22] This was developed further 
using MATLAB and a series of tests undertaken as part of a 
plan to further develop and validate the model with adjustable 
parameters. The purpose of the experiment was to investigate 
the ability to encode an RSA 2048 bit public key within a 
sound, transmit that message to another receiving machine 
and then decode or recover the message from the transmitted 
message. This lab test generated useful insight into the future 
direction of the research and in particular the feasibility of this 
steganography technique in a sound PKI technique. More 
testing is required to establish the practical soundness of the 
overall method.  
In the experiment, the key is hidden information in the first 
few milliseconds of a music sample. It was found to have the 
benefit of not increasing the size of the overall sound file, and 
if tuned correctly has no impact that can be detected by the 
human auditory system (an essential quality for audio 
steganography). It is also simple to implement in its current 
form and works effectively in the digital domain providing the 
sensitivity is set correctly. This in itself is a useful finding on 
its own. The technique however requires further development 
if it is to be successful in “over the air” applications. The 
findings from this lab test will also be useful in the scope and 
development of a conceptual framework of how this technique 
might be used in a wider context. 
VII. CONCLUSIONS & FUTURE RESEARCH DIRECTION 
With the market for voice driven services growing and the 
security concerns rising, the demand for extra low friction 
authentication will increase. This will be especially 
important if such devices are to gain widespread acceptance 
in high security applications such as online banking or 
healthcare. In this research a new conceptual model for 
authenticating users has been proposed that uses audio 
steganography to transmit key material. The path for the 
next phase of research has been outlined for testing and 
refining the model. Future experimental work to be 
undertaken will include decoding the “over the air” signals 
using techniques such as perceptual hashing, bit error rate 
mapping and dynamic warping distance for feature 
extraction for dealing with real world noisy environments. 
This paper has outlined the vulnerabilities faced by voice 
controlled systems and outlined preliminary research into 
both a conceptual model and future experimentation into 
using audio passwords to secure voice controlled systems.  
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